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Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible 
climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them [1]. Negotiations 
have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma 
[2], though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used [3,4].  Many of 
these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible positive 
outcomes – that is, agreements with the requisite emissions reduction commitments 
[5,6]. Other work on large-scale social dilemmas suggests that it should be possible to 
resolve the climate problem [7-9]. It therefore appears that equilibrium selection [10] 
may be a barrier to successful negotiations. Here we use an N-player bargaining game 
in an agent-based model with learning dynamics to examine the past failures of, and 
future prospects for a robust international climate agreement. The model suggests 
reasons why the desirable solutions identified in previous game-theoretic models have 
not yet been accomplished in practice and what mechanisms might be used to achieve 
these solutions.     
Many models of climate negotiations attempt to capture a wide range of realistic features of 
the climate problem so as to achieve descriptive accuracy; studies based on the Stability of 
Coalitions model exemplify such an approach [11-16]. Focusing instead on the dynamical 
behaviour of a simple bargaining game, we are able to identify possible barriers (and 
solutions) that may be hidden by more complex models. Most game-theoretic studies on the 
climate problem ask whether stable solutions exist, but relatively few use evolutionary or 
learning dynamics to explore whether they are achievable.  Such approaches consider the way 
that imperfect agents may adapt to each other’s behaviour and how this affects the chance of 
reaching solutions [19]. We model the learning dynamics in the context of bargaining over an 
allotment of a fixed emission total. 
We use a modified version of the Nash bargaining game [19] with N players representing the 
negotiating countries or coalitions. Each player’s strategy set is the interval [0,1] representing 
the range of possible reductions: 1 representing the ‘business as usual’ (BAU) 100% 
emissions, and 0 representing no emissions. Let di correspond to a player’s demand for some 
proportion of their BAU emissions (equivalently, this represents their proposed reduction). 
Players may also differ in size and similar demands from larger players will mean more 
emissions. Let si represent the size of a player and t = Σi disi represent the total of all demands 
made adjusting for the size of the players. 
Suppose there is also a target value T that must be met if a set of demands is to constitute a 
successful solution. T is a global reduction goal ranging from 0 to 1 representing the global 
reduction necessary for an agreement as a proportion of business as usual. For a given set of 
demands from all players the payoff to each of them is defined as: 
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If the target value is reached, the demand set is viewed as successful and a possible 
agreement. The perceived payoff in this case is equal to the amount of the shared resource 
demanded. If the target is not met, the payoff is devalued by a factor of 0 < δ < 1, which 
represents the importance of reaching an agreement. Lower δ means the more payoffs are 
devalued in the event of non-agreement. The payoff function represents the perceived payoff 
of making a particular demand given the demands of others. The payoff function implies that 
players will always favour demands closer to their BAU strategy unless increasing their 
demands threatens to collapse a potential agreement. 
The original Nash bargaining game had only two players, each making a single demand, and 
had fixed disagreement payoffs. Analysis of this game has traditionally taken the form of 
identifying specific preferred solutions that satisfy different sets of requirements [20, 21]. 
Other bargaining studies have considered the effects of introducing additional strategic 
complexities [22, 23]. Our approach retains much of the simplicity of the original game and 
focuses on the challenge that learners face during bargaining [24]. 
To represent adaptive agents within the context of negotiations, we will consider a sequence 
of simultaneous demands made by each agent, where each demand is visible to all agents. 
Agents may learn during the negotiations and change their demand between each round of 
negotiation. We will model the learning process using a variation of simultaneous fictitious 
play – agents form expectations about the other players’ demands based on past behaviour 
and respond by making a demand that maximizes payoff given these expectations [25-27]. 
Traditional fictitious play forms expectations of others’ choices by assuming they are 
randomizing among observed strategies in a fixed way. In our model, however, agents form 
expectations by determining the mean of others’ previous demands (see the supplementary 
information, SI, for comparison of this and the traditional approach). In each round, each 
agent makes a demand to maximize her return given the anticipated demands of others. The 
resulting state is a product of the interdependent individual choices. Initial demands are 
randomly chosen among those that agents are willing to consider; any di < δ is excluded. 
Note that agents are not aware feasible solutions are possible until they observe a 
combination of demands such that an individual adjustment could reach the target value. 
Feasible solutions are sets of demands that are (i) at or under the target value and (ii) 
constitute an equilibrium situation where no player can do better by demanding more or less. 
Such solutions exist whenever the target value is at least as large as the sum of the minimum 
demands. If this condition is met, any set of strategies such that t = T Σi si is a strict Nash 
equilibrium of the game, and no player can deviate from these states without making 
themselves worse off (see Proposition 1 in the SI). Consequently, a feasible solution will be 
stable if it is reached in negotiations. What is not clear, however, is whether agents can 
reliably reach such solutions. 
Even if there are feasible solutions there may be other possible outcomes that are less 
desirable. In particular, it is possible for negotiations to break down and for everyone to opt 
for their BAU strategy. If the distance between the target and the sum of the maximum 
demands is greater than what any one player can reduce, disagreement equilibria exist. 
Moreover, these disagreement equilibria also constitute strict Nash equilibria of the game and 
thus can be possible outcomes for adaptive agents in the game (see Proposition 2 in the SI). 
Therefore, the game includes a potential obstacle to successful negotiations that is not related 
to stability of feasible solutions: whether learners can find these solutions and avoid 
disagreement equilibria. 
We used computer simulations to determine whether agents that learn during negotiations can 
find feasible solutions and how likely they are to reach these solutions. These simulations 
also allow us to assess the effects of changes in the bargaining situation. In what follows, we 
will assume a target value of T = 0.5 representing a goal of reducing emissions to 50% of 
BAU. Higher target values make agreement easier and lower target values make agreement 
more difficult. Suppose that any negotiations that get within 1% of the target value within 
100 rounds count as a success. Simulations reveal that both feasible solutions and 
disagreement equilibria are observed and that players typically converge on equilibria 
quickly. In a typical negotiation, agents will begin with widely dispersed demands and react 
strongly to early rounds before converging on either a feasible solution or the disagreement 
equilibrium (Fig. 1). 
There are a variety of factors that affect the chance of success. One such factor is the number 
of players. While negotiations can produce both agreement and disagreement equilibria with 
any number of players, the chance of successful negotiation dramatically decreases as the 
number of players increases (Fig. 2). 
The discount factor for disagreement outcomes can also substantially impact the chance of 
reaching a successful agreement. The higher δ, the higher the minimum acceptable demand is 
for each player. Higher minimum demands means higher average initial demands as well as 
more constraints on the sets of demands that can constitute successful agreements. 
Heterogeneity of the size of players has a positive impact on reaching an agreement. As a 
subset of players is made larger, the success rate for negotiations increases (Table 1). The 
reason that heterogeneity helps to reach a positive solution is that it introduces some 
constraints on the dynamics; games with less flexible players resemble games with fewer 
players. Examining cases with players of varying sizes also reveals that successful 
negotiations tend to be those where the larger players make proportionally larger concessions 
(Table 2). Since larger players have a larger impact on total emissions, adjustments on their 
part tend to make up a more substantial part of reaching the reduction target. Players 
responsible for larger shares of global BAU should expect to make larger proportional 
reduction commitments in successful negotiations. 
The initial starting point of the negotiation process is crucial to the end result. If too many 
players start with very high demands, negotiations usually break down. The reason for this is 
that the further above the target the total demands are, the more collective action it takes to 
reach the target. While the result is intuitive it has an important moral: any mechanism that 
encourages initial demands that are closer to the target value will increase the chance that an 
agreement is reached. Introducing restrictions on initial demands to limit their size has a 
positive effect on the success of negotiations. This positive effect can be enhanced by also 
restricting minimum initial demands (Fig. 3). Restricting both maximum and minimum initial 
demands improves the success rate by ensuring both reasonable starting demands and 
flexibility in future rounds of negotiation. 
We can also represent the possibility of side-deals, or reduction agreements made before the 
bargaining process. To do this, we reduce the maximum possible demand for one or more 
players thus restricting the strategy space for those players. This will have the effect of 
reducing, on average, the players’ initial demands as well as constraining their maximum 
demands during the negotiation process. Such prior reductions can have a dramatic impact on 
the likelihood of successful negotiations. Examining prior reductions in cases with agents of 
different sizes also reveals some interesting effects. For instance, a prior reduction from a 
large number of smaller players is better than an equivalent reduction from a small number of 
larger players (Table 3). This suggests that prior agreements among smaller players can be 
more important for success than similar prior agreements from larger players. However, if 
these prior reductions are accompanied by higher minimum demands, perhaps because 
players that make prior reductions feel entitled to higher demands during negotiations, then 
the success rate tends to decline. Prior reductions – constraints on maximum demands – will 
be less effective or counter-productive if they are accompanied by constraints on minimum 
acceptable demands. 
Our model addresses the possibility that the problem in reaching an international climate 
agreement is not one concerning the existence of successful solutions but of realizing them in 
negotiation. It captures two important features of international negotiations simultaneously: 
distribution and coordination. A successful agreement requires coordination in the form of 
compatible demands, but all players also have an incentive to reduce emissions as little as 
possible. The idealizations and simplicity of the model mean that lessons for policy 
recommendations should be treated with caution [27]. Nevertheless, insofar as the model 
captures the core of continuing negotiations, we have identified some potential difficulties for 
international climate agreements as well as possible ways to address these difficulties. 
There are sufficient interactions within the UNFCCC process to satisfy the learning 
conditions in the model, which is itself applicable to both Kyoto-style grand bargain 
approaches and Copenhagen-style collaborative reduction approaches to reaching an 
agreement. In both cases, parties observe the declarations of others and respond with their 
own declarations. Thus, the model is neutral on the process for how reduction commitments 
are made: merely altering the mechanism is unlikely to change the outcome. It also suggests 
that when positive outcomes are reachable, they are achieved relatively quickly. Such 
considerations imply that unless the conditions of the UNFCCC negotiations change 
dramatically, future success is doubtful. However, the model indicates ways in which the 
chances of a successful agreement could be improved. 
First, the large number of players (countries) involved in the negotiations appears to present a 
significant barrier to a positive outcome from the negotiation process. However, introducing 
the right kind of constraints on players can improve the prospects for agreement. For 
example, if the United States and China were to reach a bilateral reduction agreement outside 
of the UNFCCC, which they then brought into the negotiation, the chance of success 
increases. Indeed, any players, large or small, can do a service to the process by making 
agreements outside of it – and reaching side agreements should be relatively easy precisely 
because they involve just a few players. Rather than undermining the UNFCCC process, 
additional negotiation venues could help facilitate a broader international agreement [28-29]. 
In fact, it seems that prior commitments from a larger number of smaller emitters can be 
more important than similar commitments from fewer larger emitters. An important proviso 
is that reduction commitments accompanied by increased constraints on the minimum 
acceptable share of emissions can make negotiations harder. External commitments and side 
agreements need to be made in a way that constrains the maximum demands but does not 
‘lock in’ higher minimum demands. 
The model also suggests that the likely outcome of negotiations is sensitive to initial 
demands. If too many players are too far away from their proportional share of reductions, 
negotiations are likely to break down. Any mechanism that encourages initial demands closer 
to the target values will increase the likelihood of success. 
Finally, the results suggest that a successful outcome is more likely the greater the expected 
disvalue of failure. The worse the parties see failure to address global climate change to be, 
the more likely they are to reach agreement. Similarly, an agreement is more likely the 
smaller the perceived costs of implementing the reductions necessary to reach commitments. 
For instance, technological developments leading to inexpensive low-emission energy 
sources may mean lower maximum demands as well as a greater willingness to consider 
higher amounts of reduction. Economic or political incentives could also influence the 
perceived payoff for successful agreement as well as the initial demands in negotiations, both 
of which could increase the chance of reaching a successful agreement. However, the model 
suggests that it is unlikely that small changes along these fronts will bring about solution 
feasibility. Rather, dramatic shifts would be required to significantly change likelihood of 
success. 
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[Figure 1 – See Figure File] 
 
Figure 1: The demands of three players (y-axis) during the initial rounds of negotiation 
(x-axis) from a characteristic example simulation where players converge on a feasible 
solution. Players are of equal size. δ = 0.1. 
 
[Figure 2 – See Figure File] 
 
Figure 2: The frequency of reaching a feasible solution (x-axis) as a function of the 
number of players involved (y-axis). 105 simulations per data point, and all players are 
of equal size. 
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Figure 3: The effect of introducing restrictions (r) on initial demands. When restrictions 
are placed on initial demands, such demands are drawn with uniform distribution from 
[+r, 1] or [, 1-r] for restrictions on minimum demands or maximum demands 
respectively. When restrictions are placed on both maximum and minimum, initial 
demands are drawn from [+r, 1-r]. Here =0.1 with eight players of equal size. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of success in an eight-player negotiation where players 1 and 2 are 
varied in size (s1 and s2) making up an increasing proportion of global BAU. For these 
simulations s1 = s2, all other players were held at a constant size less than or equal to the 
first two players. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average demand in successful agreements as a function of an agent's size. 
Results averaged among 5,414 successes of 10,000 simulations with six agents of varying 
sizes (1, 2,…,6). 
Agent size 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 
Average final demand in 
successful negotiations 
≈ 0.687 ≈ 0.606 ≈ 0.545 ≈ 0.510 ≈ 0.473 ≈ 0.426 
 
 
 
Sum of s1 and s2 25% of BAU 40% of BAU 50% of BAU 66% of BAU 
Freq. of success 0.1982 0.2173 0.2885 0.6143 
 Table 3. Success rates under different prior commitments in 10,000 simulations of eight 
agents, two of which comprise 25% of total player size each. Other agents are of equal 
size. The right column lists the success rate when the prior agreements are associated 
with a proportional increase in minimum demands. 
 
 
 
Scenario Success rate With increased minimum 
Baseline (no prior reductions) 0.2918 0.2918 
10% prior reduction from two largest 0.3921 0.2533 
10% prior reduction from six smallest 0.4440 0.3501 
5% prior reduction from all 0.4063 0.2817 
20% prior reduction from two largest 0.5480 0.2402 
20% prior reduction from six smallest 0.7128 0.5303 
10% prior reduction from all 0.5967 0.2874 
